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The possibility of increased production of genetically modified (GM) crops in agriculture 
accentuates the need to examine the feasibility of GM and non-GM technologies coexisting on a 
common physical landscape.  Using the theory of clubs, this paper examines the possibility of co-
existence for GM and organic wheat technologies through the formation of an organic club with 
an endogenously determined buffer zone.  Given the available data on prices, yields, and 
rotations, it is shown that a club can be created in which GM and organic agricultural production 
technologies can economically co-exist in the same physical landscape. Specifically, co-existence 
results in an increase in economic welfare over a situation where only GM technology is used but 
is not Pareto superior because producers in the buffer zone will incur injury. We show that 
organic producers in the club can compensate producers in the buffer zone and still be better off.  
Hence, the compensation principle holds.  
 
JEL Classifications:  D71, Q16 
                                                           
1 Senior authorship is not assigned.  
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Landscape Clubs: Co-existence of GM and Organic Crops 
Introduction 
  Over the past decade, organic agriculture has emerged as a profitable form of farming in 
North America and Europe.  The rapid growth in demand for organic products has shifted organic 
agriculture from a cottage industry to a significant segment of the agricultural mainstream.  Retail 
sales of organic products in both North America and Europe are estimated to be increasing by 20-
25% annually, and were valued at approximately 9.5 billion and 10 billion dollars in the two 
regions, respectively, in the year 2000 (Verschuur and van Well, 2001).  In 2003, there were 
approximately 10,000 organic farmers in North America, and acreage was estimated to be 3.3 
million acres (Yussefi, 2003).
2   
  Organic crop production prohibits the use of some modern inputs including synthetic 
pesticides, fertilizers, and genetically engineered seeds (often referred to as genetically modified 
organisms or GMOs).
3   Products can only be labelled “certified organic” if all procedures 
occurring along the supply chain (from crop production to processing) have been verified to 
comply with established organic standards.  Producers of most “certified organic” products are 
able to obtain a price premium over conventional products of similar type and quality.
4 
To obtain “certified organic” status at the farm level, a crop must be 100 percent free of 
GMOs,
 which implies that any chemical test of the organic product would be negative for the 
presence of a GMO in the sample being tested. This requirement raises the issue of whether 
organic production of an open pollinated field crop, such as wheat or canola, can share a common 
                                                           
2 The major organic crops are wheat, corn, soybeans, flax, lentils, peas, forages, and horticulture crops. 
3 GMO refers to any plant that has recombinant DNA; that is, where DNA has been extracted from one 
organism and recombined with the DNA of another. 
4 To obtain premiums over conventional crops, organic commodities must be segregated from conventional 
commodities as they move along the supply chain.   Compliance with organic standards (including 
segregation) is ensured through audit trails.  These audits allow buyers at each successive stage of the 
supply chain to determine the origin of individual products.   In cases where crops are exported, regulators 
in importing countries typically verify organic authenticity through a variety of procedures including an 
evaluation of the standards employed by the exporter, an inspection of audit trails, and through testing for  
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landscape with varieties of the same crops that are produced using GM technologies.  In Canada, 
for example, farmers who produce organic canola claim that the presence of GM canola varieties, 
and the occurrence of genetic drift, makes it impossible for them to have their organically 
produced canola certified as organic.  They are currently in the process of suing Monsanto and 
Aventis for losses resulting from their inability to market their canola organically (Hamm et al. 
2002). Such impurities have been known to arise through the mixing of crops during or after 
harvest (e.g. in combines, granaries, other equipment, etc.), and through the growth of volunteer 
crops in subsequent years.  
The issue described above is also being raised in the European Union (EU), where GM 
crop production, and its impact on organic and conventional production, has taken on significant 
debate (Villalon, 2002). As is the case in Canada, this debate is contingent upon whether or not 
different production technologies can exist in the same landscape.  However, given the close 
proximity of European countries, the debate in the EU pertains to the ability of producers to 
maintain GM free crop zones on a regional or even a national basis. 
One possible solution to the problem described above is for organic producers to form a 
landscape club (with a buffer zone) in which only organic production can occur.  Although rare in 
agriculture, the formation of clubs is a common mechanism through which a group of individuals 
derive collective benefits or deal with external threats to potential club members
5. In this case, a 
club would allow organic producers to farm in an area that is free from the risk of GM 
contamination, and would allow producers outside the area to farm using GM technology. Under 
these circumstances, it may be possible for organic producers to experience an increase in 
economic welfare without decreasing the welfare of GM producers.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
the presence of banned substances, including GMO’s.  Contamination of a shipment with banned 
substances will result in rejection of the shipment, ultimately at the expense of the organic farmer. 
5For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was a club of nations formed to deter the 
Soviet threat to Western Europe.    
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The objective of this paper is to examine the economic feasibility of organic and GM 
wheat technologies co-existing in the same landscape.  We hypothesize that the co-existence of 
GM and organic technologies can result in an increase in the total economic welfare of producers 
over the situation where only one technology is employed.
6 Using a simple economic model and 
actual data from Saskatchewan
7 organic wheat farmers, we show that given existing premiums, 
organic wheat producers could form a landscape club, pay the costs associated with operating the 
club, and still increase their economic welfare.
8  This paper does not investigate potential 
institutional or logistical implications associated with forming such a club. Rather, we examine 
the economic feasibility of club formation and discuss institutional arrangements in the historical 
context of club formation. 
The paper is organized into six sections. Section two provides and overview of club 
theory and describes how the theory of clubs can be used as a framework to examine the co-
existence of crop production technology. The third section describes the theoretical model, while 
the fourth section discusses the empirical model and results. The fifth and sixth sections of the 
paper are institutional implications and conclusions, respectively. 
 
Club Theory 
Modern club theory, first introduced by Buchanan in 1965, evolved out of literature on 
the formation of groups. Buchanan suggested that agents form groups to share the cost of 
excludable public goods and in the process confer externalities upon each other (Scotchmer, 
2002).  Taking this notion further, Sandler and Tschirhart (1997) suggest that club theory is based 
upon two basic premises.   First, the presence of crowding requires the size of a club to be 
                                                           
6 The premise of co-existence arose because some consumers have concerns regarding the safety of GM 
products.  This paper does not address this issue. 
7 The preferred jurisdiction to study is Canada; however, data on organic wheat production was only 
available for Saskatchewan. 
8 The existence of a price premium for organic wheat over conventionally produced wheat is reported in 
Hamm (2002).  
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restricted. That is, as club size increases, it begins to function less efficiently, and eventually 
reaches the point where the costs of maintaining the club are greater than the benefits it confers. 
The second premise is that the membership size of the club and the provision of club goods are 
interdependent allocation decisions (Sandler and Tschirhart, p. 336).  
In addition to the two premises above, Sandler and Tschirhart (1997) identify four 
characteristics of club goods that distinguish them from public goods. First, clubs must be 
privately owned but are voluntary in terms of membership. Second, all non-members of a club 
must be completely excluded from the benefits of membership. Third, there can be no overlap of 
a club’s membership (i.e. members cannot be both inside and outside of the club). Finally, there 
must be an institutional arrangement to monitor club members, to collect fees, and to keep non-
members outside of the club. In the case of an organic club modeled in this paper, all six of the 
characteristics described here are assumed to exist.  
As an economic tool, club theory has been used to examine the incentives for club 
formation and the conditions under which clubs can feasibly exist.  It has been applied to a wide 
range of issues most notably the break-ups and formations of jurisdictions (Bolton and Roland 
1987), the optimal use of land for urban planning (Dixit, 1973) and the optimal construction of 
road ways in urban centers (Solow and Vickery, 1971). In recent years, jurisdictional applications 
of club theory have incorporated spatial components to the formation of clubs (Casella, 2001).  
In our case, a club is defined on a physical agricultural landscape, and is formed in 
response to the commercialization of GM wheat.  The club forms to protect its members from a 
possible negative externality, namely contamination with GM wheat. Within the proposed club, 
all crop production is organic (i.e. it is an organic producers club), while outside the club, farmers 
will use GM crop technologies
9. As with traditional club theory, the size of our club is restricted 
by the problem of crowding.  Crowding occurs because only a certain acreage of cropland can be 
                                                           
9 Producers can produce organic crops outside the club boundary; however, rationally they would not do so 
because their crops would likely become contaminated.  
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used to produce organic wheat before the price becomes too low to cover production costs.  That 
is, as the size of the organic club increases, the supply of organic wheat increases, which in turn 
reduces the price that buyers of organic wheat, are willing to pay.  
 
Theoretical Model 
  We define a club as an institution whose members collectively decide to finance the 
creation of an excludable club good through a tax. In our case, the excludable club good is an 
organic premium that can be earned by selling organic crops.  The premium can only be obtained 
by implementing a zoning law that restricts the use of GM seed varieties. Inside the boundary of 
the club, producers will produce exclusively organic crops, while outside the boundary; producers 
will produce GM crops. To illustrate how the club size is determined we initially assume that a 
buffer zone is not required; however in subsequent discussion, we do incorporate a buffer zone.  
Returning to our original hypothesis, the question becomes “can organic producers 
generate an increase in total producer welfare by implementing a zoning law that exclusively 
allows organic production to occur within a confined geographical space?”  That is, by forming a 
club, can organic producers earn enough organic premium to improve overall producer welfare, 
once the additional costs of the club and the costs of establishing and enforcing the zoning law are 
included? 
Figure 1 presents the situation without a buffer zone, or alternatively, the situation where 
contamination can be eliminated completely and costlessly.  The horizontal axis is the total output 
that can be obtained if all available farm land is used for wheat production. As can be seen in 
Figure 1, GM producers face a flat demand curve DGM, while organic producers face a downward 
sloping demand curve D0. The reason for this is that GM producers are assumed to be price takers 
for wheat, while organic producers are assumed to be able to influence wheat price by increasing 
or decreasing supply. Our model further assumes that producers are risk neutral regardless of the 
production technology they choose.  
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The objective function of the organic club is to maximize profits given the demand 
(average revenue) function for wheat. We assume that land is homogenous and that the land 




∏o ═ Po [Qo(Lo)] * Qo(Lo) – r * Lo ---1.0 
 
where, Po  is the organic wheat price, Qo(Lo) is the production function for organic wheat,  r is the 
rental rate for land and Lo is the land that is used for organic wheat production. 
  Similarly, the profit function of GM wheat producers can be written as: 
  
∏G ═ PG * QG(LG) – r * LG ---2.0 
 
where PG  is the GM wheat price, QG(LG) is the production function for GM wheat,  r is the rental 
rate for land and LG is the land that is used for GM wheat production. It is assumed that all land 
area (LT) is used either in the production of organic wheat or GM wheat. This is secured by the 
constraint:  
 
LT ═ Lo + LG ---3.0 
 
The total profit equation, after substituting the land constraint, can be written as:  
 
∏T ═ ∏o + ∏G ═ Po [Qo(Lo)] * Qo(Lo) – r * Lo + PG * QG(LT – Lo) – r * (LT – Lo) ---4.0 
 
                                                           
10 If organic wheat producers form a club they would be able to operate as a monopolist. We assume they 
operate as such in the rest of this analysis.  
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The solution of the joint profit maximization problem yields: 
 
∂ ∏T ⁄ ∂ Lo ═ [  Po + ( ∂ Po  ⁄ ∂ Qo ) ]  ( ∂ Qo  ⁄ ∂ Lo ) – r  + PG ( ∂ QG  ⁄ ∂ LG )  + r ═ 0 ---5.0 
 
The solution can be re-organized to obtain: 
 
Po [ 1 – 1  ⁄  │ ε o│] ( ∂ Qo  ⁄ ∂ Lo )  ═  PG ( ∂ QG  ⁄ ∂ LG )     ---6.0 
 
The first order condition (FOC) for the profit maximization problem has a solution where 
the marginal revenue product of the organic producers will be equal to value of marginal product 
of GM producers (i.e.  MRo* MPLo ═ PG * MPLG). If the marginal productivity of land in both 
organic and GM production is the same ( MPLo ═ MPLG ), the FOC requires that the marginal 
revenue of organic farming will be at least equal to the price of GM wheat i.e. PG ═ MRo. 
However, the marginal productivity of land in organic farming is lower than that of GM farming, 
thus yielding a higher marginal cost curve, as shown in Figure 1 (i.e. MPLo <  MPLG). Hence, 
marginal revenue obtained by the organic producers must be greater than the price that is obtained 
by the GM producers (i.e. PG < MRo) . For this to occur, organic producers must receive a 
premium over the price of GM wheat that depends on the elasticity of demand for organic wheat. 
Equation 7.0 reveals that the lower the elasticity of demand for organic products, the higher will 
be the price premium of organic wheat over GM wheat. 
 
Po  ⁄  PG  >  1  ⁄  [ 1 – 1  ⁄  │ ε o│] ---7.0 
 
If a buffer zone is created, producers in the buffer zone will have lower productivity as they will 
be subject to restrictions the organic producers have (resulting in higher costs of wheat 
production), but they will receive the lower conventional wheat price.  In this case, producers in  
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the buffer zone will have to be compensated by the organic club an amount that makes them 
indifferent between being in the buffer zone and being outside the buffer zone. The profit 
equation of the organic club in this case can be written as: 
 
∏C ═ Po [Qo(Lo)] * Qo(Lo) – r * Lo  – {Po [Qo(Lo)] – PG } QB(LB) – r * LB ---8.0 
 
where LB is the land reserved for the buffer zone. LB is assumed to be related to the size of the 
organic land area as follows LB ═ α Lo where α is the ratio of the area of land in the buffer zone to 
the area of land in the club. 
  The overall profit equation in this case can be written as: 
 
∏T ═ Po [ Qo(Lo)] * {Qo(Lo) – QB(LB)} – r * ( Lo +  LB) + PG * QG(LT – ( Lo + LB)) – r * (LT – ( Lo 
+ LB)) ---9.0 
 
The first order condition for the maximization problem above can be obtained as: 
 
∂ ∏T ⁄ ∂ Lo ═ ( ∂ Po  ⁄ ∂ Qo ) *  ( ∂ Qo  ⁄ ∂ Lo ) {Qo(Lo) – QB(LB) } 
 
+ Po * { ( ∂ Qo  ⁄ ∂ Lo ) – α ( ∂ QB  ⁄ ∂ LB ) } – r ( 1 + α ) 
 
– ( 1 + α ) * PG ( ∂ QG  ⁄ ∂ LG )  +   r ( 1 + α )═ 0 ---10.0 
 
Assuming  ∂ Qo  ⁄ ∂ Lo  equals ∂ QB  ⁄ ∂ LB, rearranging gives: 
 
Po * ( 1 – α ) * {1 – 1  ⁄ │ ε o│}*( ∂ Qo  ⁄ ∂ Lo ) ═ ( 1 + α ) PG ( ∂ QG  ⁄ ∂ LG ) ---11.0 
 
Equation 11.0 then reduces to: 
 
Po * {1 – 1  ⁄ │ ε o│}*( ∂ Qo  ⁄ ∂ Lo ) ═ { ( 1 + α ) ⁄  ( 1 – α ) } PG ( ∂ QG  ⁄ ∂ LG ) ---12.0  
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which can be re-arranged as:  
 
Po  ⁄ PG = { ( 1 + α ) ⁄  ( 1 – α ) } ⁄  {1 – 1  ⁄ │ ε o│} *  { ( ∂ QG  ⁄ ∂ LG )   ⁄   *( ∂ Qo  ⁄ ∂ Lo ) } –13.0 
 
where { ( 1 + α ) ⁄  ( 1 – α ) } ⁄  {1 – 1  ⁄ │ ε o│} is the premium received for organic wheat over 
the GM wheat. It is evident from this equation that the smaller the elasticity of demand for 
organic products and the higher α for a given level of output, the higher will be the premium. The 
premium will also depend on the relative marginal productivities of GM and organic wheat 
production. The lower the marginal productivity of land in organic farming (or the higher the 
marginal cost), the higher will be organic wheat prices relative to GM wheat prices. 
It is evident from the above equation that introducing a buffer zone explicitly to 
the model increases the required premium. This can also be reflected as an upward shift 
of the marginal cost curve for organic producers in Figure 1, resulting from having to 
compensate the producers in the buffer zone.  The optimal organic output decreases to Q1 
and the price of organic wheat increases.  If the buffer zone is specified at a fixed width 
surrounding the organic farm area, then the ratio of the buffer zone area to the organic 
farm area will decline as the organic farm area expands. In this case, the shift of the 
marginal cost curve would be a pivotal one (as opposed to a parallel shift). Implicitly, 
such a result suggests that it is cheaper to provide an effective buffer zone around one 
large contiguous land mass than many smaller individual operations.  
 
Empirical Model and Results 
Using the theoretical model developed in the previous section, a matrix of organic price 
premiums is calculated for various club sizes, demand elasticities, and buffer zone widths.  
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Comparing these premiums to actual organic wheat premiums allows us to determine the 
parameters under which an organic club can viably exist. The empirical calculation is divided into 
two stages. In the first stage, the parameter alpha (α) is calculated for several land-club sizes and 
buffer zone widths. We assume that the club shape is circular and has a circular buffer zone 
surrounding it. The total buffer zone area is a function of both the club size and an exogenously 
chosen buffer zone width.  Because the buffer zone width necessary to prevent pollen drift is 
uncertain, we calculate buffer zone areas for widths varying from 100 to 400 meters.  The club 
and buffer zone are illustrated in Figure 2. The specification of the club as circular allows us to 
calculate the parameter alpha as:  α =   (r2 
2 - r1 
2 ) / r2 
2, where  r2  is the radius of the club area, r1 
is the radius of the buffer zone, and α is the relationship between the clubs radius and the width of 
the buffer zone.  Calculated parameter levels of α for various buffer zone and club size are 
presented in Table 1.  
In the second stage, α is used to calculate minimum premiums required for maintaining a 
landscape club that can maximize profits for its members and compensate farmers in the buffer 
zone. These premiums are calculated for club radiuses ranging from 1000 to 30000 meters, 
elasticities of demand ranging from 2 to 13, and buffer zone widths ranging from 100 to 400 
meters. The results of the premium calculation are presented in Table 2. 
It can be seen in Table 2 that as the elasticity of demand for organic wheat increases, the 
premium required to make the organic club viable decreases. Similarly, as the radius of the club 
increases the required premium decreases. In contrast, the width of the buffer zone appears to 
have little impact on the required premium.  This is likely because the buffer zone width is very 
small relative to the club’s radius. A review of existing yield and price data reveals that there is an 
existing premium of organic wheat prices over the conventional one, although the organic yields 
are lower than the conventional yields (see Table 3).  Based on the figures in Table 3, it can be 
argued that an organic club that maximizes the welfare of the producers in the club while 
compensating the farmers in the buffer zone can be formed and maintained for some  
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combinations of elasticities and buffer zone areas. These combinations are shown in Table 2 as 
bold characters.     
 
Institutional Feasibility 
  Examining the economic feasibility is a first step in evaluating the practicability of 
creating an organic club on the Canadian agricultural landscape.  A second step is determining the 
type of institutional arrangements under which an organic club could be created and maintained.  
In accordance with club theory, there are three relevant parameters pertaining to the institutional 
feasibility of the creation and management of an organic landscape club. First, do the farmers or 
landowners have the human capital and social networks to undertake such collective action? 
Second, is it constitutionally legal for a group of farmers or landowners to restrict the type of 
technology used within a fixed area? Finally, are there public policies in place that allow for 
monitoring and penalties in the event that non-permitted technologies are used? 
  There are at least two pieces of historical evidence where Canadian farmers have 
exhibited the social networking ability and level of coordination required to overcome collective 
action problems associated with different crop production technologies. The first evidence is the 
collective action taken by farmers and landowners when rapeseed was first introduced as a crop in 
Canada  in the early 1960s.   Rapeseed and mustard seed are genetically and visually 
indistinguishable, yet the oil and meal products derived from each crop are very different. For this 
reason, the two crops cannot be mixed. When rapeseed was introduced, there was no mechanism 
to mechanically separate it from mustard, so farmers and landowners collectively agreed not to 
grow the two oilseed crops in the same rural municipality (RM). If the majority of farmers in each 
RM wanted to grow rapeseed, then mustard was not grown. The opposite was true when farmers 
preferred to grow mustard. Each municipality made its own decision regarding which of the two 
crops to grow, and each municipality monitored and enforced this arrangement through moral 
suasion. There were no side payments made to those who did not participate.   
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  A second historical example of successful social networking for the purpose of collective 
action is the notion of cooperatives. Farmers have a long history in the creation and operation of 
grain (and other) cooperatives in Saskatchewan for the purpose of earning higher returns or 
developing value-added (reference). While these cooperatives have not been involved in placing 
limitations on what can and cannot be grown in specific areas, they have created strong social 
networks of farmers, indicating that the level of cooperation required to create and maintain an 
organic club is possible.  
  Despite the evidence of producer cooperation described above, there is a noteworthy 
difference between the historical examples discussed here and the formation of an organic club 
that could make club formation difficult to achieve.  In the first example, producers were merely 
deciding whether or not a specific crop variety should be grown, and regardless of an RM’s 
decision to grow or not grow that crop variety, they were not required to change their farming 
practices. In contrast, the formation of an organic club involves producers within or outside the 
club committing to specific crop production technologies and utilizing somewhat different 
farming practices.  A decision to form an organic club means that all producers within the clubs 
boundaries must produce organically, while those outside must use conventional or GM 
technology.  Given the wide dispersion of organic farmers in Saskatchewan, this could only be 
achieved through having some producer’s switching production technologies or moving their 
farm to a location where the technology that they prefer is permitted. The differing philosophical 
ideologies associated with each production technology suggest that either of these options could 
be problematic.  On the other hand, when faced with the proposition of having one technology 
eliminated entirely, these options may eventually be deemed as a viable option.  
The second parameter mentioned above has to do with whether or not farmers and land 
owners have the constitutional right to constrain what can be grown on specific landscapes. The 
Canada Act places the constitutional authority for the use of agricultural lands under the 
provincial government. However, some of the authority over the use of agricultural lands has  
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been delegated to rural municipalities thought the Saskatchewan Rural Municipality Act. This act 
gives municipal governments the power to enforce specific agronomic practices. For example, 
rural municipal governments have the authority to remove named noxious weeds from farmer’s 
fields and to make farmers pay the costs associated with monitoring and enforcing this policy.  
This suggests that by working through the various levels of government, producers do in fact 
have some control over the types of crops that can be grown on a given landscape.     
  The final parameter pertains to whether or not there are policies in place that allow for the 
enforcement of specific production technologies. Currently, there are no regulations preventing 
the production GM wheat on Saskatchewan farms. All varieties of wheat that are marketed 
through public marketing channels, such as elevators, must be registered by the government. 
Farmers can and do grow unregistered varieties on their farms but can only use the grain on-farm 
for such things as livestock feed. At present, the only reason GM wheat is not currently grown is 
because the company that did the plant breeding has not released the variety in any country. If 
that company chooses to release GM wheat in the United States for example, and the wheat is 
brought into Canada in a “brown bag”, it could be legally grown.  This suggests that current 
policies would make it difficult to enforce the use of specific production technologies if producers 
chose not to obey rules associated with maintaining an organic club. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has shown that under existing organic and conventional prices and yields, it is 
economically feasible for organic producers to form an organic club with a buffer zone that 
allows both GM and organic production technologies to co-exit on a common physical landscape.  
In the case modelled here, co-existence results in an increase in economic welfare over the 
situation where only GM technology is used. The existence of a buffer zone around the organic 
club prevents contamination from occurring but at the same time causes economic injury to buffer  
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zone farmers.  However, the benefits accruing to organic club farmers are more than enough to 
compensate these farmers for their losses. 
Despite these economic results, it should be noted that there exists a plethora of 
institutional and logistical problems associated with forming an organic club like the one 
described here.  The most notable of these is the issue of organizing organic farmers into one 
contiguous land mass such that a single buffer zone can be created.  Historical evidence suggests, 
however, that farmers are extremely adaptable and flexible in the face of adversity, and that 
although the formation of an organic club currently seems improbable, it should not be ruled out 
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 Table 1.0 Calculation of the buffer zone parameter (α) 
 
Radius of  the club (meters)  Buffer zone 
(meters)  1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 7500 10000  20000 30000
100  0.2100 0.1025 0.0678 0.0506 0.0404 0.0268 0.0201 0.0100 0.0067
200  0.4400 0.2100 0.1378 0.1025 0.0816 0.0540 0.0404 0.0201 0.0134
300  0.6900 0.3225 0.2100 0.1556 0.1236 0.0816 0.0609 0.0302 0.0201








Table 2.0  Necessary Price mark-up  





















































Source: Authors’ calculations 
Elasticities 




(meters)  Buffer zone 100 meters 
1000 4.32 3.24 2.88 2.70 2.40 2.34 
2000 3.46 2.60 2.31 2.16 1.92 1.88 
3000 3.23 2.42 2.15 2.02 1.79 1.75 
4000 3.12 2.34 2.08 1.95 1.73 1.69 
5000 3.06 2.29 2.04 1.91 1.70 1.66 
7500 2.98 2.23 1.98 1.86 1.65 1.61 
10000 2.94 2.20 1.96 1.83 1.63 1.59 
20000 2.88 2.16 1.92 1.80 1.60 1.56 
30000 2.86 2.14 1.91 1.79 1.59 1.55 
  Buffer zone 200 meters 
1000 7.25 5.44 4.83 4.53 4.03 3.93 
2000 4.32 3.24 2.88 2.70 2.40 2.34 
3000 3.72 2.79 2.48 2.33 2.07 2.02 
4000 3.46 2.60 2.31 2.16 1.92 1.88 
5000 3.32 2.49 2.21 2.08 1.84 1.80 
7500 3.14 2.36 2.09 1.96 1.75 1.70 
10000 3.06 2.29 2.04 1.91 1.70 1.66 
20000 2.94 2.20 1.96 1.83 1.63 1.59 
30000 2.90 2.17 1.93 1.81 1.61 1.57 
  Buffer zone 300 meters 
1000 15.37 11.53 10.25 9.61 8.54 8.33 
2000 5.50 4.13 3.67 3.44 3.06 2.98 
3000 4.32 3.24 2.88 2.70 2.40 2.34 
4000 3.86 2.89 2.57 2.41 2.14 2.09 
5000 3.61 2.71 2.41 2.26 2.01 1.96 
7500 3.32 2.49 2.21 2.08 1.84 1.80 
10000 3.19 2.39 2.12 1.99 1.77 1.73 
20000 3.00 2.25 2.00 1.87 1.66 1.62 
30000 2.94 2.20 1.96 1.83 1.63 1.59 
  Buffer zone 400 meters 
1000 138.16 103.62 92.11 86.35 76.76 74.84 
2000 7.25 5.44 4.83 4.53 4.03 3.93 
3000 5.06 3.80 3.37 3.16 2.81 2.74 
4000 4.32 3.24 2.88 2.70 2.40 2.34 
5000 3.95 2.96 2.63 2.47 2.19 2.14 
7500 3.51 2.63 2.34 2.20 1.95 1.90 
10000 3.32 2.49 2.21 2.08 1.84 1.80 
20000 3.06 2.29 2.04 1.91 1.70 1.66 
30000 2.98 2.23 1.98 1.86 1.65 1.61  
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159.00 11  000  000 133.20  0.80 
Organic wheat  294.60 (*)    145 043 (**)  118.30  0.61 (***) 
Genetically 
modified wheat 
148.00  125.00  0.86 
 
Sources: (*)  Organic Crops Price Survey, SRC Publication, No: 10245-1F04, October 2004. 
  (**) Agriculture Canada Organic Statistics (2003) 
  (***) Personal Communication with Brenda Frick  
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Figure 2. Specification of the landscape club and the buffer 
zone
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